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One of the leading cognitive models of auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) proposes
such experiences result from a disturbance in the process by which inner speech is
attributed to the self. Research in this area has, however, proceeded in the absence of
thorough cognitive and phenomenological investigations of the nature of inner speech,
against which AVHs are implicitly or explicitly defined. In this paper we begin by
introducing philosophical phenomenology and highlighting its relevance to AVHs, before
briefly examining the evolving literature on the relation between inner experiences and
AVHs. We then argue for the need for philosophical phenomenology (Phenomenology)
and the traditional empirical methods of psychology for studying inner experience
(phenomenology) to mutually inform each other to provide a richer and more nuanced
picture of both inner experience and AVHs than either could on its own. A critical
examination is undertaken of the leading model of AVHs derived from phenomenological
philosophy, the ipseity disturbance model. From this we suggest issues that future work
in this vein will need to consider, and examine how interdisciplinary methodologies may
contribute to advances in our understanding of AVHs. Detailed suggestions are made for
the direction and methodology of future work into AVHs, which we suggest should be
undertaken in a context where phenomenology and physiology are both necessary, but
neither sufficient.
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INTRODUCTION
The experience of hearing a voice in the absence of an appro-
priate external stimulus, formally termed an auditory verbal
hallucination (AVH), is found in people with a range of psy-
chiatric diagnoses, including schizophrenia, bipolar disorder,
post-traumatic stress disorder, as well as in non-psychiatric pop-
ulations (Larøi et al., 2012). In attempting to understand the
causes of AVHs, researchers have explored the experience at
multiple levels, including the neurological, cognitive, and soci-
ological (McCarthy-Jones, 2012). Yet all these levels of explana-
tion must take into account the findings of phenomenological
studies of AVHs. A detailed knowledge of the phenomenology
of AVHs is necessary, firstly, in order to ensure that mod-
els are explaining what voice-hearers are actually experiencing
and, secondly, in order to obtain clues as to what may be
underpinning the experience of AVHs (McCarthy-Jones et al.,
2012).
Consistent with this proposal, Garcia-Montes et al. (2012)
have argued that research should give people diagnosed with
psychosis a “turn to speak,” i.e., that it should take a
phenomenological approach, involving in-depth questioning of
people about their subjective experiences, with questions that sus-
pend or “bracket” presuppositions about the phenomena under
investigation, including its normality or abnormality, and its
causes (Stanghellini and Lysaker, 2007). Garcia-Montes et al.
also suggest that giving people “increased importance in defin-
ing their experience may assist in fine-tuning concepts used by
the cognitive tradition, usually taken from research in basic psy-
chology . . . and extrapolated without further ado to the field of
schizophrenia.” They note that this could lead to cognitive psy-
chology “leaving behind its tendency to reduce symptoms or
clinical phenomena to premade concepts.” Such an approach has
the potential to interrogate some unexamined assumptions in the
study of AVHs, even if they are eventually found to be innocent.
For example, many models in the cognitive psychology paradigm
assume that AVHs are altered forms of normal cognitive pro-
cesses (such as inner speech or memory), and often uncritically
recruit such concepts into their explanatory models. However,
it is possible that AVHs may be a distinct experience, without
roots in these normal cognitive processes, and thus requiring
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entirely new mechanisms and processes to explain them. One
method by which such assumptions can be examined is through
the use of philosophical phenomenology to undertake a detailed
phenomenological investigation of AVHs.
Philosophical phenomenology is a systematic investigation of
subjectivity, a consideration of experience from the first-person
perspective of the “I” (Moran, 2000; Sokolowski, 2000). For
phenomenologists, this first-person emphasis involves an anal-
ysis of basic structures of consciousness such as intentionality,
self-awareness, temporality, embodiment, spatiality, agency, and
intersubjectivity. It is through these basic structures that the world
becomes manifest within our conscious life. Phenomenology is
thus concerned with the constitutive processes that give our
experience of the world and ourselves its formal coherence.
In light of this first-person orientation, phenomenology might
be thought of as the foundational science for psychopathology
(Fuchs, 2010; although, as we noted above, there is no neces-
sary link between AVHs and states that could be described as
pathological).
Methodologically, phenomenological investigations of con-
sciousness involve a disciplined seeing (Gallagher, 2012). This
means that phenomenology (literally, the “science of appear-
ances”) looks to provide a rigorous description of experien-
tial phenomena as they reveal themselves to consciousness. As
Heidegger puts it, this disciplined seeing involves letting “that
which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which
it shows itself from itself” (Heidegger, 1962, 58/34).
The first step of phenomenological seeing begins by suspend-
ing taken-for-granted assumptions or judgments about the cause,
normality, or reality of what is experienced (Broome et al., 2012).
This formal suspension (or epoché, as Husserl, 1960, termed it)
of metaphysical and scientific judgment is a port of entry into
the inner structure of experience. For, rather than focus on exter-
nal factors or explanations, we instead carefully observe what we
experience just as we experience it; our subsequent descriptions
are based on this “naïve” presuppositionless seeing. Within the
clinical context, this means that the investigator suspends etio-
logical and diagnostic considerations and instead re-focuses on
the character and meaning of the patient’s experience from their
perspective. Questions here include: what is it like for the patient
to have a particular experience or be in a particular mental state
(e.g., to be depressed or hear voices)? How do salient phenomena
within this experience manifest to the patient? What is the mean-
ing of this experience for the patient and how does it relate to their
present situation?
In relation to the experience of AVHs, employing a philo-
sophical phenomenological approach and being guided by the
experience itself may result in the deprioritization of aspects of
their phenomenology which, for a range of good or bad reasons,
have previously been deemed salient (although, to be clear, this
approach does not set out to depriortize any aspect of the expe-
rience stressed by contemporary approaches). For example, as a
result of historical factors certain aspects of AVHs have become of
a priori concern to the mind sciences, such as the quasi-fetishized
property of their location, i.e., whether AVHs are perceived as
being internally or externally located to the head. Similarly,
widely used AVH assessment tools, such as the Psychotic Rating
Scales (PSYRATS-AH: Haddock et al., 1999) have been influen-
tial in regard to which aspects of AVHs are deemed important to
enquire about (such as loudness, duration, frequency), without
any evidence that these are either the aspects research should be
focusing on, or those which voice-hearers themselves think are
important. We may also consider the very use of the term “voice-
hearing” which may not accurately capture what the person is
experiencing (McCarthy-Jones, 2012), and instead suspend such
ways of seeing to allow the person to report salient aspects of the
experience to them, in the phrasing that they prefer.
The second step involves imaginative variation, the eidetic
reduction, a process by which we intuit the essence (eidos) of
the phenomenon under consideration; we use our imagination to
alter various aspects of the phenomenon in order to discern the
invariant features that define it as the sort of entity that it is. For
example, when one sees a particular apple, one can imagine that
it might be a different color, texture, size, or weight, or have a dif-
ferent flavor, without it thereby becoming something other than
an apple. None of these features are part of its essence. A similar
process can be applied to anomalous experiences ranging from
affective depersonalization in melancholic depression to disrup-
tions of ipseity and embodiment within schizophrenia/AVHs (see
below). The payoff of this process is that the phenomenologist
gets a clearer picture of the phenomenon’s prototypical fea-
tures, information which is then used to generate more nuanced
descriptions of the patient’s overall experience. These descriptions
are further specified by subjecting them to intersubjective scrutiny
within a community of fellow scientists, phenomenologists, and
voice-hearers themselves (categories which are, of course, not
mutually exclusive). In this way phenomenology can recreate the
experiential dimension of psychiatric disorders and in so doing
provide acute descriptions of anomalous phenomena (Parnas and
Zahavi, 2000).
In relation to the experience of AVH, though, such a pro-
cess may become problematic due to the heterogeneity of the
phenomenology of the experience which makes the boundaries
of AVHs hard to define (McCarthy-Jones, 2012). For example,
experiences which are traditionally classed under the umbrella
term “AVH” may range, phenomenologically, from an experi-
ence which is just like hearing another person speak, to an
experience that is more thought-like than voice-like, through
to an experience of a message being communicated to oneself
that takes the form of a soundless, silent “voice” (Moritz and
Larøi, 2008; McCarthy-Jones, 2012). Philosophical phenomenol-
ogy may hence be able to examine whether these are qualitatively
distinct experiences (involving distinct neural circuitry) or if they
lie on a continuumwith each other—e.g., a core experience which
may range on dimensions such as its acoustics from clearly heard
words to silent messages.
The third step is to return to the experience itself in order
to assess the descriptive adequacy of these descriptions and cat-
egories. Within psychopathology, this involves a return to the
clinical context. Here the phenomenologist can check the appro-
priateness of her/his findings by the phenomena she/he encoun-
ters (Fuchs, 2002). This process of recreating and analyzing the
patient’s lived experience thus takes the phenomenologist down
into the basic structures of consciousness. It provides valuable
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insight into how these structures organize non-pathological expe-
riences of self and world and, crucially, how and where these basic
structures become compromised or disrupted within anomalous
experience.
Whilst philosophical phenomenology is likely to benefit our
understandings of a range of experiences, AVHs appear to be an
arena where it can be particularly fruitful. This is because there
has been both a failure to understand the background of “ordi-
nary” inner experiences that AVHs are (implicitly or explicitly)
defined against, as well as a failure to understand exactly what the
experience of having AVHs is like. Before continuing though, it
is worth being explicit as to what philosophical phenomenology
can and cannot offer AVH research. It is not the aim of philosoph-
ical phenomenology to offer an explanation of the mechanistic
processes underpinning AVHs, which is a task for neurocognitive
approaches, but instead to facilitate this indirectly through pro-
viding a more accurate description of the experience. This can
be of use in a number of ways, some of which we have already
discussed. However, two key related benefits are that it can, (1)
provide an account of the experience that can be the explanatory
target of neurocognitive models of AVHs, and (2) allow the eval-
uation of existing neurocognitive models against this experience,
i.e., if existing models are not explaining the actual experience of
AVHs, but rather an incomplete, misleading, or partial portrait
of the experience, then they are flawed and in need of revision.
Despite this, some argue (e.g., Merleau-Ponty, 1962), that there
can be no truly presuppositionless seeing, no “total” epoché, and
that, just like cognitive psychology, philosophical phenomenol-
ogy has its own set of concepts that influence the aspects of AVHs
that are attended to, such as the embodiment of the experience or
its temporal or spatial character. Such insights have been gained
via phenomenological reflection on the nature of experience.
However, techniques such as the epoché can at least significantly
improve our descriptions of phenomena, bracketing our assump-
tions re: causation and the “natural attitude” even if they are still
viewed through some form of interpretive lens.
INNER EXPERIENCE AND AVHs
Although there are manymodels of AVHs, such as memory-based
models (Waters et al., 2006a), hypervigilance models (Dodgson
and Gordon, 2009), and social deafferentation models (Hoffman,
2007), we will focus in this paper on how philosophical phe-
nomenology may be applied to what is currently the dominant
model (in terms of being the most empirically investigated, as
well as most discussed) model of AVHs, the inner speech model.
This model proposes that AVHs result from a disturbance to the
process whereby inner speech is attributed to the self (e.g., Frith,
1992; Leudar et al., 1997). However, progress in this area has been
hampered by a lack of attention to the phenomenological prop-
erties of inner speech and, relatedly, AVHs. In particular, there
is a need for improved empirical research on key properties of
inner speech that have been proposed to be of value in explaining
the relation between inner speech and AVHs (Fernyhough, 2004;
Jones and Fernyhough, 2007).
One such factor is dialogicality, which refers to the ability
of inner speech to incorporate multiple perspectives on reality
(Fernyhough, 1996, 2004). Dialogicality has been proposed to
result from the development of inner speech through the inter-
nalization of structured linguistic exchanges with caregivers and
others during the course of development (Vygotsky, 1934/1987;
Fernyhough, 1996). This quality of inner speech has been pro-
posed as an explanation for why AVHs often manifest voices of
others alongside that of the self (Fernyhough, 2004; Jones and
Fernyhough, 2007). A second important quality is condensation,
the tendency of utterances in inner speech sometimes to appear
phenomenally as having a condensed or “note-form” quality.
Condensation has been proposed as a further reason why inner
speech can take multiple forms, such as in the proposed distinc-
tion (Fernyhough, 2004) between “condensed inner speech” (in
which the internal utterance is fully stripped-down and abbrevi-
ated) and “expanded inner speech” (in which internal utterances
retain their full linguistic structure). Transition between forms of
inner speech (condensed and expanded) has been put forward, in
an extension of the basic inner speech model of AVHs, to explain
why voices can suddenly intrude into consciousness (Fernyhough,
2004).
The empirical study of inner speech has of course been ham-
pered by its unobservability. Some support for the dialogicality
and condensation dimensions of inner speech was provided by
McCarthy-Jones and Fernyhough (2011) who, using a self-report
scale (the Varieties of Inner Speech Questionnaire), found the
existence of these dimensions in a healthy sample of adults.
Other empirical methods proving useful in the study of inner
speech are dual-task methods in which the language system is
temporarily blocked by, for example, articulatory suppression,
and experience sampling methods such as the phenomenologi-
cal Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES; Hurlburt and Heavey,
2006).
There has been little research on the phenomenological prop-
erties of inner speech and AVHs in those who hear voices. In
the only study to provide a systematic analysis of inner speech
phenomenology alongside AVH phenomenology, Langdon et al.
(2009) found no significant differences in inner speech phe-
nomenology between people diagnosed with schizophrenia who
heard voices and non voice-hearing healthy controls. For exam-
ple, there were no differences between the two groups in the
form, speed, and pragmatics of their inner speech, and no rela-
tions between patients’ inner speech and their voices in terms
of variables such as frequency and pragmatics. However, there
was a trend toward reduced dialogicality of inner speech in the
patient group (in the sense of inner speech being less likely to
take on an overt dialogic form), potentially suggesting a relation
between a reduced normal inner dialogue and the presence of
AVHs.
Of course, inner speech only forms a subset of inner experi-
ences (Hurlburt and Heavey, 2006), and a recent study of the phe-
nomenology of AVHs has suggested that a diverse range of inner
experiences, such as verbal and non-verbal memories, as well
as inner speech, may form the basis of AVHs. McCarthy-Jones
et al. (2012) assessed the phenomenology of AHs in 199 psychi-
atric patients, using an interviewer-led semi-structured interview.
In addition to reporting on a comprehensive range of proper-
ties of AHs, this study also employed cluster analysis (clustering
by variable and hence identifying within-individual differences,
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rather than between-individual differences) and found four sub-
types of AH, which they termed Constant Commanding and
Commenting AVHs, Own Thought AVHs (which did not address
the voice-hearer, spoke in the first-person, were experienced
as being similar to memories, and possibly being one’s own
voice/thoughts), Replay AVHs (which were reported as being
identical to previously experienced heard speech), and Non-
verbal AHs (which were either language which did not make
sense, or non-verbal sounds). It appears plausible that each of
these subtypes of AHmay result from distortions to distinct forms
of inner experience, and that a better understanding of normal
inner experience is therefore required before this can be mapped
onto the phenomenology of AHs.
“PHENOMENOLOGY” AND “pHENOMENOLOGY”
The empirical methods of psychology for studying inner speech
and other forms of inner experience such as AVHs entail clear
limitations. Retrospective introspection of the form demanded
by self-report studies is likely to be unreliable in certain cir-
cumstances, while dual-task methods gain little traction on
phenomenology and rely on potentially misplaced assump-
tions about the recruitment of inner speech in cognitive tasks.
Although DES is founded in phenomenological principles and
is careful to ensure the bracketing of presuppositions, it can
be criticized for its failure to generate generalizable empirical
data. Philosophical phenomenology, which we denote here as
Phenomenology (phenomenology with a big “P”), can poten-
tially enrich the methods of self-report, introspection, etc. that
psychologists and cognitive scientists have traditionally relied on,
which we refer to as phenomenology (phenomenology with a
small “p”).
Phenomenology can supplement and enrich phenomenology
because the former works at a distinct but nevertheless com-
plementary level of analysis to the latter. That is, whereas
phenomenology and its methods of self-report, introspection,
etc. yield important data about the specific contents of experi-
ence (i.e., what a subject is experiencing), Phenomenology is—in
addition to this data—also concerned with the formal structures
of experience (i.e., how the subject is experiencing the “what”).
This “transcendental” aspiration is essential to Phenomenological
methodology (Husserl, 1989).
Again, this transcendental aspiration is apparent in
Phenomenology’s concern with how basic structures inherent in
consciousness (e.g., intentionality, self-awareness, temporality,
embodiment, spatiality, agency, intersubjectivity, etc.) organize
and constitute experience and imbue it with a first-personal
character. Data from phenomenological reports (e.g., patient
vignettes in psychiatry) can lend important clues to how and
where these basic structures become compromised or dis-
rupted within anomalous experience. However, Phenomenology
can further contextualize these often fragmentary or isolated
reports within a broader transcendental context. This is because
Phenomenology offers a sophisticated framework for describing
experience and existence that enables the psychopathologist to
address concrete issues of diagnosis and treatment while remain-
ing mindful of how these local concerns relate to overarching
issues such as time, space, self, and intersubjectivity (Parnas and
Zahavi, 2000). Accordingly, Phenomenology does not simply
consider symptoms in isolation (i.e., as localized manifestations
of brain dysfunction); nor does it reduce diagnostic entities to
statistically relevant clusters of symptoms (Fuchs, 2010). Rather,
these are considered in the broader context of the subject and the
whole of consciousness in which they emerge, that is, as typical
modes of human experience and existence through which the
subject constitutes her experience of self, world, and other.
As Thomas Fuchs (2010) notes, this structural empha-
sis of Phenomenology is a search for what he terms “psy-
chopathological organizers” connecting single features (e.g.,
affective depersonalization in melancholic depression or autism
in schizophrenia) within a larger experiential gestalt. This
emphasis “helps define mental disorders on the basis of their
structural experiential features, linking apparently disconnected
phenomena together” (Fuchs, 2010, p. 549). The end result—
in light of these complementary levels of analysis—is that
phenomenology and Phenomenology can together provide a
richer and more nuanced picture of the phenomenon under
consideration than can either approach on its own.
PHENOMENOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY AND AVHs
THE IPSEITY MODEL OF AVHs
One attempt to utilize phenomenological philosophy to help
understand AVHs has come from Sass and Parnas (2003). An
examination of their resultant account of AVHs is informative of
the strengths and limitations of the application of phenomeno-
logical philosophy to AVHs. Their model involves a phenomeno-
logical analysis of ordinary experience, as well as that experienced
by people with AVHs, and then the use of this analysis to propose
what processes may be underpinning AVHs. Sass and Parnas’s
approach is derived from a phenomenological analysis of two
facets of the intentional act: (1) a pre-reflective embeddedness in
the world, and (2) a tacit or pre-reflective self-awareness or ipse-
ity (literally, “self” or “itself”). The term “ipseity” refers to the
experiential sense of being a subject of experience, i.e., one’s own
first-person perspective on the world. The basic sense of ipseity
in normal consciousness, argues Sass (2003), is reflected in some-
one “whose experiences are unified and owned rather thanmerely
flying about loose” (p. 244).
Sass and Parnas (2003) argue that there are occasions, such as
in schizophrenia, where this basic sense of self or ipseity becomes
fragmented or otherwise disturbed. In the case of schizophrenia,
disturbed ipseity exhibits two main features. The first is hyper-
reflexivity, a form of exaggerated self-consciousness in “which
something normally tacit becomes focal and explicit” (p. 430).
For example, some patients report that normally tacit sensorimo-
tor processes animating everyday behavior (e.g., getting dressed,
drinking coffee, interacting with others, etc.) may lose their
automaticity. Instead, the background repertoire of propriocep-
tive and kinaesthetic processes informing this behavior move
to the foreground of the patient’s focal attention; they become
hyper-aware of the effort required to produce each gesture or
movement—so much so that their body is eventually experienced
as a mechanical object, resulting in an experience of disembod-
iment or “self-alienation” (p. 429). Alternatively, other patients
report that particular details of a scene, or specific qualities of
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faces or persons, stand out with a kind of hypersalience; they
are dislodged from the gestalt of the situational context and thus
appear strange or uncanny (Wiggins and Schwartz, 2007). Even
the perceptual act itself may rise to the level of focal awareness
(e.g., “I became aware of my eye watching an object,” Stanghellini,
2004, p. 113). Hyper-reflexivity thus objectifies normally tacit,
pre-reflective processes of agency and perception.
In a later paper (Nelson et al., 2009), the authors make clear
that although hyper-reflexivity is a concept that includes an exag-
gerated intellectual or reflective process, it is not “at its core, an
intellectual, volitional, or ‘reflective’ kind of self-consciousness.
It primarily refers to acts of awareness that are automatic (non-
volitional) and not intellectual in nature, as in the case of kinaes-
thetic experiences ‘popping’ into awareness” (Nelson et al., 2009,
p. 809). As hyper-reflexivity makes focal what was once tacit, the
experience can hence not be transparently inhabited by the self;
hyper-reflexivity introduces a rupture within the basic structure
of experience. This leads to the second, complementary com-
ponent of ipseity disturbance: a diminishment of self-affection,
which Sass and Parnas (2003) define as a reduction in the sense
of basic self-presence; “the implicit sense of existing as a vital
and self-possessed subject of awareness” (p. 429). For example,
patients may report feeling an inner distance from their stream of
consciousness (“I saw everything I did like a film-cameram” Sass,
1992, p.132), or “an inner void” or “lack of inner nucleus” where
the self would normally be (Parnas and Handest, 2003). As ipseity
disturbances, hyper-reflexivity and diminished self-affection thus
erode the basis sense of self-presence and perspectival coherence
that enables us to maintain an experiential grip on the world and
on ourselves as embedded in the world.
Sass and Parnas (2003) propose that AVHs (and schizophre-
nia more generally) result from such an ipseity disturbance. They
argue that in texts such as Ey (1973), Tissot (1984), Naudin et al.
(2000), an altered state of self-awareness can be seen to occur
before AVHs. Specifically, they argue that “the patient experiences
his or her own subjectivity as becoming in a certain way ready
for something strange to happen . . . Mental processes and inner
speech . . . are no longer permeated with the sense of selfhood but
have becomemore like introspected objects, with increasingly rei-
fied, spatialized, and externalized qualities” (p. 432). Commonly
encountered AVHs, such as voices commenting on a hearer’s on-
going behavior, are, in Sass and Parnas’ view, “emblematic of the
self-consciousness that generates this self-alienation.” From this
they conclude that AVHs “involve a sense of alienation from and
a bringing to-explicit-awareness of the processes of conscious-
ness itself.” Sass argues that this occurs through “an automatic
popping-up or popping-out of phenomena and processes that
would usually remain in the tacit background of awareness” (Sass,
2003, p. 156). As such they “do not involve the addition of any-
thing new but only an awareness of what is always present (e.g.,
of inner speech, the perfectly normal medium of much of our
thinking) in the context of diminished self-presence” (Sass and
Parnas, 2003, p. 433). In their view, AVHs therefore “represent the
perfectly normal phenomena of ordinary human experience—
which, however, are radically transformed because of being lived
in the abnormal condition of hyper-reflexive awareness and
diminished self-affection” (p. 433).
LIMITATIONS OF THE IPSEITY ACCOUNT
Phenomenological fusion
This interesting account has a number of notable limitations.
Firstly, and most problematically for an ostensibly phenomeno-
logical account, although this model is strong in its analysis of
the phenomenology of disturbances to normal experience (e.g.,
ipseity disturbances) and how this may be applied to AVHs, it
lacks a comprehensive understanding of the phenomenology of
AVHs to which is it trying to link. It therefore demonstrates what
could be termed a lack of “phenomenological fusion,” i.e., a fail-
ure to link the known phenomenology of inner experience to
the known phenomenology of AVHs. This criticism has previ-
ously been noted by Leudar and Thomas (2000) who state that
Sass’ “characterization of voices of schizophrenics [sic] is based
on case materials which reflect traditional construals of voices in
psychiatry rather than on the ground-floor experiences of indi-
viduals with schizophrenia” (p. 95). For example, Sass (1992)
states that “the voices schizophrenics [sic] hear tend to emanate
not from any particular person or object in external space but
from inside the body or from the sky” (p. 233), and that patients
with schizophreniamost frequently have voices which “havemore
of a conceptual or cognitive than a sensory or perceptual taint, as
if heard with the mind rather than the ear” (p. 233). Neither of
these observations is consistent with the observed phenomenol-
ogy of the majority of AVHs (Nayani and David, 1996; Moritz
and Larøi, 2008; McCarthy-Jones et al., 2012). Indeed, Sass’ lat-
ter observation above comes from a statement of Bleuer in which
Bleuler only says voices “may” take this form. However, Sass, at
the time of this theory’s development, did not have access to
the large systematic studies of AVHs available today (e.g., Nayani
and David, 1996; McCarthy-Jones et al., 2012), and hence the
recourse to less systematized studies of AVH phenomenology is
understandable. The lesson we may take from this is that the
philosophical phenomenological approach needs to be applied
both to normal experience and to AVHs, and to linking these
together.
Specificity to AVHs
A second limitation is that despite the apparent argument made
for a causal role of ipseity in AVHs, in a later paper Sass and col-
leagues (Nelson et al., 2009) argue that “ipseity disturbance seems
to be independent of symptom manifestation,” still being present
in the remitted phase of schizophrenia, hence making it a “trait or
underlyingmarker of vulnerability, independent of the expression
of this vulnerability in the form of psychotic symptoms” (p. 809).
Similarly, Garcia-Montes et al. (2012) observe that high levels of
“self-focused attentions are not exclusive in patients with auditory
hallucinations, but that, in general, they characterize all patients
with positive psychotic symptoms.” This could be interpreted as
the proponents of this theory arguing that ipseity disturbances
are a necessary, although not sufficient cause of AVHs. However,
Sass focusses on AVHs in people diagnosed with schizophrenia,
which is not only a contested diagnostic entity (Boyle, 2002) but
a diagnosis that only contains around a third of people who hear
voices (McCarthy-Jones, 2012). It could therefore potentially be
the case that ipseity disturbances are linked to schizophrenia per se
and have no causal relation with AVHs. It is also possible that
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ipseity disturbances are not found in other populations who hear
voices, and are therefore not necessary for AVHs, and even if ipse-
ity disturbances were found to be a necessary but not sufficient
cause for AVHs, this would still leave the question as to what
other additional factors are required for AVHs to ensue. Finally,
it is also possible that in some populations or situations ipseity
disturbances may be sufficient for AVHs. For example, the pres-
ence of AVHs in people undertaking intense introspection, such
as the Desert Fathers (Christian monks in the third century who
retired to the deserts of Egypt to pray:McCarthy-Jones, 2012) is at
least suggestive that self-focus might be a sufficient cause of some
AVHs.
Empirical testing and levels of explanation
At present there is very limited empirical evidence support-
ing Sass’s ipseity account of AVHs. Although Sass (2003) was
originally explicit that his account was “largely descriptive or
interpretative rather than explanatory in nature” (p. 244), a
more recent paper by Sass and colleagues (Nelson et al., 2009)
has gone on to make some specific hypotheses, such as that
the ipseity model predicts “an increase in self-focusing as caus-
ing a tendency to experience the object of focus as other-
than-self (i.e., externalising or objectifying self-experience)”
(p. 813). Linking this to a neurological level of explanation,
they further state that this account “would predict that psy-
chotic phenomena should be associated with increased cortical
midline system (CMS) activity, to the extent that the distur-
bances of hyper-reflexivity and diminished self-affection suggest
an increase in self-focusing as causing a tendency to experi-
ence the object of focus as other-than-self” (p. 813). Although
phenomenological work leading to predictions at a neurologi-
cal level is a promising way forward (see below), unfortunately
for this specific hypothesis, activation of such structures dur-
ing AVHs was not found in a recent meta-analysis (Jardri et al.,
2011).
A recent paper by Garcia-Montes et al. (2012) considers the
relation between Sass and Parnas’s (2003) work and contempo-
rary cognitive psychology. Garcia-Montes et al.’s overall argument
is that there are noticeable parallels between “hyper-reflexivity”
and some cognitive models of schizophrenia/AVHs that concen-
trate on attentional processes in such patients. However, it is
unclear quite how Sass and Parnas’s (2003) concept of hyper-
reflexivity maps onto established psychological constructs. One
possibility is that it relates to the psychological concept of meta-
cognition (Garcia-Montes et al., 2012), which includes a range of
items, including cognitive self-consciousness. However, a recent
meta-analysis of the association between of meta-cognition and
hallucination-proneness found only a weak association (Varese
and Bentall, 2011). Nevertheless, what can be seen from this is
that phenomenological philosophy needs to engage with (and
potentially extend or revise), existing psychological constructs, in
order to operationalize and test hypotheses that phenomenologi-
cal philosophy has generated.
A further empirical limitation of this account is that other
theories of AVHs predict the exact opposite to Sass and
Parnas (2003). For example, Dodgson and Gordon (2009) argue
that hypervigilance AVHs result specifically when attention is
externally focussed. There is hence the need for an empirical
investigation into the locus of attention of voice-hearers imme-
diately preceding AVHs, which should be a priority for future
experience-sampling studies of this phenomenon.
Benefits in terms of informing neurocognitive research
Although there is the need for phenomenological philosophy
to engage with the concepts of existing neurocognitive work, it
is also worth considering how it may extend these paradigms
through critique. For example, Sass and Parnas’s (2003) model
can be considered in relation to the source-monitoring account of
AVHs. Source-monitoring accounts of AVHs argue that a deficit
in the skill of being able to distinguish between self-generated
internal cognitions and non self-generated external perceptions
leads the former to be mistaken for the latter, resulting in AVHs
(Bentall, 1990). “Source monitoring” is used as a global term to
cover both reality monitoring (the ability to differentiate between
internally generated cognitions and external perceptions) and
self-monitoring (the ability to differentiate between self- and
other-produced stimuli). Although Sass and Parnas (2003) state
that their account is “rather different” (p. 432) to the established
self-monitoring deficit account of AVHs, they do not clearly set
out their points of difference (in a later paper, they state that self-
monitoring accounts are “redolent” of their ipseity model; Nelson
et al., 2009).
In either case, Nelson et al. (2009) note that source-monitoring
studies often require a reflective judgement about the source of
a stimulus, making it unclear whether conscious self-reflection
or the pre-reflective processes emphasized in their phenomeno-
logical accounts of ipseity disturbance in schizophrenia are being
assessed. This inconsistency in experimental tasks may be able to
account for the limitations in the existing psychological source-
monitoring literature, which is somewhat contradictory. For
example, whilst a recent meta-analysis has suggested specificity
of source-monitoring deficits to AVHs (Waters et al., 2011), other
studies have instead suggested that it is delusional ideation, not
AVHs, that is linked to source-monitoring deficits (Allen et al.,
2006; see McCarthy-Jones, 2012, for a review of the current
evidence). There is hence the need for further consideration
as to whether source-monitoring tasks involve conscious self-
reflection or pre-reflective processes, and to examine these two
separate forms of source-monitoring in relation to AVHs specif-
ically, to see if both, neither or just one of these is related
to them.
Summary
In summary, accounts of AVHs drawn from phenomenological
philosophy may be valuable but need to ensure that: (1) if build-
ing from the phenomenology of normal inner experience, that
this is then mapped onto the actual phenomenology of AVHs,
(2) if descriptions of the experience are developed into a mech-
anistic account of AVHs, that they offer a mechanism specific to
AVHs and not to schizophrenia per se, and (3) that their propos-
als lead to empirically falsifiable predictions at both a neural and
cognitive level, clearly operationalizing their concepts in the lan-
guage of these disciplines through collaboration with colleagues
in such areas. For example, if a philosophical phenomenological
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approach were to predict that memory disturbances play a causal
role in AVHs, then it would need to go on to predict how this may
be reflected in neural activation during AVHs, what differences
in performance on standard cognitive tests of memory would be
expected, and what new memory tasks may potentially be needed
in order to detect predicted changes. The resultant benefits of this
approach are that it may both offer us a better understanding
of the phenomenology of AVHs, and offer valuable critiques of
existing psychological constructs, such as source-monitoring.
Once such original first-person data has been collected, it may
then be utilized within a wider interdisciplinary research pro-
gram, to guide the discovery of new objective (third-person)
data at the neurophysiological level. Such an approach is already
advocated in the methodology of neurophenomenology (Varela,
1996), in which trained introspection leads to first-person data
which can then guide investigation at the third-person, neuro-
physiological level. Neurophenomenological work in non-AVH
related fields (Lutz et al., 2002) can be seen to suggest how AVHs
may be explored using neurophenomenology. For example, the
use of Phenomenology to detect distinct aspects of the hearing
voices experience, such as the claim noted above that an altered
state of self-awareness occurs before AVHs, could then be used
to lead a search for whether these states have distinct neurologi-
cal components, and how AVHs result from a cascade of neural
activity resulting from an altered state of self-awareness.
Another example of a wider interdisciplinary research pro-
gram engaging with the phenomenology of hearing voices comes
from the work of the “Hearing the Voice” project at Durham
University (e.g., Macnaughton, 2011). In this project, work on
both the Phenomenology and phenomenology of the hearing
voice experience is being undertaken from disciplines includ-
ing modern and medieval literary studies, theology, philosophy,
psychology, and the medical humanities, with each discipline
attempting to offer unique insights into the P/phenomenology of
the voice-hearing experience (for example, medieval literary stud-
ies providing insights into how hearing voices was experienced
and understood in this period of history through analysis of texts
and documents from this era). Previous work has already demon-
strated how, for example, historical analyses can offer us insights
into the hearing voices experience (Jones, 2010). The Hearing the
Voice project is further engaging with cognitive neuroscientific
perspectives to examine how phenomenology and neuroscience
may be mutually informative, leading to better understandings of
the voice-hearing experience, and new ways to help people who
are distressed by such experiences.
Such methodologies also allow that, in addition to first-person
data informing work at the third-person level, this process may
also work in reverse (e.g., through the neurophenomenological
principle of mutual constraints), with third-person neurological
findings informing the study of the first-person phenomenol-
ogy of the experience (Varela, 1996). An approximation of this
process can be drawn from some recent studies. For example,
Diederen et al.’s (2010) functional magnetic resonance imag-
ing study of the areas of the brain activated immediately before
AVHs showed involvement of the parahippocampal gyrus, a
region of the brain implicated in memory processes, suggest-
ing that memory processes may play a role in the aetiology of
AVHs. This, in part, motivated a later phenomenological exam-
ination of the involvement of memory in AVHs (albeit, using
phenomenology rather than Phenomenology) by McCarthy-
Jones et al. (2012) who found that a notable subset of peo-
ple with AVHs (39%) reported that their AVHs were identical
and/or similar to “replays” of memories of things people had
previously heard. Further work along these lines, in which first-
person (phenomenological) and third-person (neurophysiolog-
ical) perspectives mutually inform each other, is hence to be
encouraged.
CONCLUSIONS AND EMPIRICAL PRIORITIES FOR FURTHER
PROGRESS IN THIS AREA
Phenomenological philosophy clearly has a role to play in cre-
ating a better understanding of AVHs. However, this appears
likely to necessitate a multiple stage process. First, there is the
need to use phenomenological philosophy to better understand
the Phenomenology of ordinary inner experience, as well as the
potential variability in properties of inner experience of specific
relevance to AVHs, such as the tendency for inner speech in non
voice-hearers to take on a perceptual nature. Second, as we noted
above, there is the need to assess whether unusual forms of ordi-
nary inner experience form the rawmaterial of AVHs, or whether
AVHs are unrelated to such processes and are qualitatively dif-
ferent, new forms of experiences. Phenomenological study of
both ordinary inner experience and AVHs should contribute to
addressing this question.
Third, despite the recent large scale study (McCarthy-Jones
et al., 2012) of the phenomenology of AHs noted above, there
is still the need for Phenomenological work that explores AHs
using the techniques of phenomenological philosophy. For exam-
ple, McCarthy-Jones et al. found that 12% of patients reported
that their AVHs were identical to memories of previous things
that had been spoken to them, and that 31% said their AVHs
were similar to memories. Yet phenomenological philosophy
methods are likely to be needed to probe the Phenomenology
of these experiences, and to establish what exactly participants
meant by relating their voices to memories, and the character-
istics of these experiences that led them to be labeled AVHs, as
opposed to simply intrusive memories (cf. Waters et al., 2006b).
Similarly, careful Phenomenological analysis of the varieties of
inner speech andAVHswill benefit our understanding of any rela-
tions between these experiences. Such work will need to ensure
that it creates what we have termed phenomenological fusion,
mapping through the phenomenology of inner experience onto
the phenomenology of AVHs.
Fourth, there is the need to use phenomenological philoso-
phy and other methods derived from humanities disciplines to
assess the meaning of AVHs for the person hearing them and
examine how this relates to their present situation. Such find-
ings are likely to prove of benefit for the development of cognitive
behavioral techniques (CBT) aimed at relieving voice-hearers’
distress, particularly with regard to being able to create mean-
ingful formulations. Phenomenological philosophy is also likely
to provide other benefits to CBT therapists. For example, the
greater degree of presuppositionless seeing offered by the tech-
nique of epoche, may help limit the degree to which pre-existing
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theories of AVHs, whether these be trauma-based, developmen-
tal insult-based, or recreational drug triggered-based accounts,
are employed in the therapeutic context, allowing the unique
personal circumstances of the patient to guide the development
of their formulation which is open to multiple explanations at
first. Any such studies would benefit from having a longitudinal
methodology, in order to create a developmental profile of how
individuals move from normal inner experience to AVHs (e.g.,
Raballo and Larøi, 2011), and whether this is a gradual shift or a
sharp change.
Finally, there is the need to build on such studies to map
new first-person data onto their underpinning neurophysiolog-
ical mechanisms (and vice versa), with these approaches recip-
rocally informing and mutually enriching the other. In this sense,
the design of future studies will need to undertake what Gallagher
(2003) has termed phenomenological front-loading.
One of the strengths of phenomenological philosophy, its sus-
pension of presuppositions about the causes of the phenomena
under investigation, is also a limitation for researchers interested
in the causes of AVHs. There is hence the need to explain the
results of phenomenological philosophical investigation. If, for
example, there is a disturbance of ipseity, what may cause this? It
may be important to try to understand why a person enters such
a state. This may result from a wide range of situations, such as
intense emotion/stress driving the person to turn his/her atten-
tional resources inwards, social isolation resulting in attention
turning inwards, or consciously intended meditative introspec-
tion, as with mystics throughout the centuries. Similarly, it needs
to be established why the “automatic popping-up or popping-out
of phenomena . . . that would usually remain in the tacit back-
ground of awareness” (Sass, 2003, p. 156) occurs? Why is there
this increased awareness of “what is always present (e.g., inner
speech)” (Sass and Parnas, 2003, p. 433)? When does it occur and
why? What are the neural correlates of this process? Furthermore,
which aspects of the person’s inner life are the focus of the per-
son’s attention? Does this process account for both increased
self-focus on auditory mentation (resulting in AVHs) as well as
visual imagery (resulting in visual hallucinations)? It should also
be considered that alternative mechanisms may cause different
types of AVHs. For example, hyper-reflexivity fits well with AVHs
in many healthy individuals who experience them under con-
ditions of intensive introspection. However, it appears less clear
how this maps onto AVHs of people who may have their atten-
tion externally focused during the AVH (Dodgson and Gordon,
2009).
A final consideration is how phenomenology and
Phenomenology may work together to improve our understand-
ing of AVHs. That is, how can philosophical phenomenology
potentially enrich the methods of self-report, introspection, etc.
that psychologists and cognitive scientists have traditionally relied
on? In this sense there needs to be a dialogue between research
methods based on the principles of philosophical phenomenol-
ogy and the standard semi-structured interview which is the
mainstay of qualitative research.
In conclusion, phenomenological philosophy is likely to be
able to make a significant contribution to our understanding of
AVHs, and to be a profitable and necessary partner for neuro-
physiological research. Phenomenology and physiology are both
necessary, but neither are sufficient.
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